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█ Abstract  My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, 
that is, of what came to be called attributor or ascriber contextualism. I will begin by outlining, in the first 
part, what I take to be the basic idea of and motivation behind the version of epistemic contextualism that I 
favor. In the second part, a couple of examples will be presented in order to illustrate the contextualist point. 
Since epistemic (ascriber) contextualists commonly claim that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive, 
the third part of the paper will be concerned with the phenomenon of context-sensitivity at a more general 
level. A more detailed inquiry into the context-sensitivity natural language expressions exhibit will prove 
helpful in order to counter the objection that postulating context-sensitivity in the case of knowledge ascrip-
tions is an ad-hoc-maneuver. Given that epistemic contextualism is partly an epistemological thesis, party a 
linguistic thesis, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question of how to semantically model the 
kind of context-sensitivity exhibited by knowledge ascriptions. The upshot will be that there are two differ-
ent ways of semantically accommodating the context-sensitivity at issue. Both call for a more or less drastic 
departure from epistemological and semantic orthodoxy. 
KEYWORDS: Epistemic Contextualism; Nonindexical Contextualism; Indexical Contextualism; Context-sensitivity; 
Knowledge Ascriptions.  
 
█ Riassunto  La conoscenza contestuale – In questo lavoro intendo motivare e difendere una variante del conte-
stualismo epistemico; una variante di cosa si è definito contestualismo delle attribuzioni o delle imputazioni. 
Comincerò, nella prima parte, ponendo in evidenza ciò che assumo essere l’idea di fondo e i motivi che stanno 
alla base della variante del contestualismo epistemico per cui propendo. Nella seconda parte saranno discussi 
un paio di esempi per illustrare la prospettiva contestualista. Dal momento che di solito i contestualisti episte-
mici (in merito alle attribuzioni) sostengono che le iscrizioni di conoscenza sono sensibili ai contesti, la terza 
parte di questo lavoro si occuperà in maniera più generale del fenomeno della sensibilità ai contesti. 
Un’indagine più dettagliata sulle espressioni del linguaggio naturale sensibili ai contesti si rivelerà utile per re-
plicare all’obiezione secondo cui il postulato della sensibilità ai contesti nel caso delle attribuzioni di conoscenza 
sarebbe una manovra ad hoc. Poiché il contestualismo epistemico è una tesi in parte epistemologica e in parte 
linguistica, il resto del lavoro sarà dedicato al come modellare semanticamente il genere di sensibilità al contesto 
proprio delle attribuzioni di conoscenza. L’esito sarà che ci sono due diversi modi di soddisfare semanticamente 
la sensibilità ai contesti in discussione. In entrambi i casi è richiesta una deviazione più o meno drastica 
dall’ortodossia epistemologica e semantica. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Contestualismo epistemico; Contestualismo non-indessicale: Contestualismo indessicale; 
Sensibilità al contesto; Attribuzione di conoscenza. 
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█ Epistemic contextualism 
 
EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM IS A THEORY 
about our epistemic practice. It is a theory 
about the way we ascribe knowledge to each 
other. It seeks to give an account of our every-
day practice of ascribing knowledge; an ac-
count according to which many of the more 
robust ascriptions we intuitively take to be true 
come out true. It is, therefore, a partly episte-
mological, partly linguistic theory about 
knowledge ascriptions.1  
On the traditional model of knowledge 
(that can be traced back at least to Plato’s 
Theaitetos and Menon), someone truly ascribes 
knowledge about p to a putative knower S if 
and only if S believes that p, p is true and S’s be-
lief that p is justified. All three conditions on 
knowledge are the subject of heated debates. 
Yet contextualism is not so much a theory 
about how to spell out the different conditions 
on knowledge in more detail. Rather, the con-
textualist starting point is the observation that 
a given knowledge ascription may be true as 
uttered in one context but false as uttered in 
another context, due to epistemic as well as 
non-epistemic differences between the two 
contexts of ascription.  
By way of explanation, the contextualist will 
point to a certain interest-and-purpose de-
pendency in our practice of ascribing 
knowledge. Speakers seem to set the standard 
of knowledge differently in different contexts, 
depending on their respective goals, purposes, 
etc. The interests, goals and so on that help set-
ting a certain standard need not exclusively be 
epistemic interests, though. Some of them 
ought to be epistemic interests, given that the 
standard to be determined is an epistemic 
standard; yet the contextualist point is exactly 
that other interests might play a role, too.2 And 
a particular standard is appropriate only in 
view of a particular goal or purpose, only in 
light of certain interests and concerns. Yet dif-
ferent goals or purposes call for different stand-
ards. A chat in a bar imposes another epistemic 
standard than a hearing in a court of law. If our 
goal were to avoid error at any price, it would 
be reasonable to set an extremely high epistem-
ic standard. For everyday purposes, though, a 
lower standard might do just fine. In contexts, 
for example, where sceptical scenarios (such as 
Descartes’ evil-demon scenario) are being seri-
ously discussed, the standard for knowledge 
tends to be raised. We could ascribe knowledge 
only to those who are able to rule out that the 
sceptical scenarios obtain. In more ordinary 
contexts, on the other hand, standards for 
knowledge may not be quite as high. It takes 
less to count as someone who knows in these 
contexts. Yet contextualists are not committed 
to the view that there are exactly two standards 
of knowledge: high and low; for even within 
everyday contexts standards of knowledge tend 
to vary to a considerable extent. The purposes 
speakers pursue determine which standard 
they ought to apply.  
Consequently, to ask whether someone has 
knowledge – knowledge simpliciter – is not a 
sensible question. Knowledge is something 
someone has or lacks only relative to an ascrib-
er’s point of view. It is something that we as-
cribe to someone for a particular purpose and 
in light of certain interests and concerns. It is 
not an intrinsic state of a person, not something 
he or she possesses independently of anyone 
ascribing knowledge. No particular set of be-
liefs or sense impressions (or any other evi-
dence) will make someone a knower. Just as 
there is no particular set of qualities something 
has to possess for it to be interesting or tall or 
rich, so there is no particular set of qualities 
someone has to possess in order to know some-
thing. Nothing is interesting, tall or rich in it-
self. It is interesting, tall and rich only com-
pared to something else and in a particular re-
spect. And which class it will be compared to 
and in what respect it will be compared to 
members of that class has to be determined by 
and will vary with the interests, concerns, as-
sumptions, etc. of those drawing the compari-
son. Similarly with knowledge; it, too, is in the 
eye of the beholder (or ascriber), as Crispin 
Wright aptly puts it.3  
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Moreover, knowledge will be ascribed to 
someone in order to mark a special epistemic 
status. The word “know” is a honorific term.4 
Knowledge ascriptions are used «in a kind of 
epistemic gate keeping for communities with 
which the attributor and interlocutors are asso-
ciated».5 We ascribe knowledge of p to some-
one in order to indicate that she is to be treated 
as an authority, as a potential informant, as 
someone to rely on when it comes to the ques-
tion of whether p or not. Yet whether we want 
to rely on someone’s assertion to the effect that 
p depends on what is at stake, on what our in-
terests, intentions, concerns, and purposes 
happen to be. Since these factors vary with con-
text, whether someone ought to count as a 
knower by our standards varies accordingly. 
We call someone a knower if she answers to 
our epistemic needs. That is what makes 
knowledge ascriptions sensitive to context.  
By way of summary, I suggest characteriz-
ing epistemic contextualism by its allegiance to 
the following two-part position:  
(i) We ascribe knowledge to someone in or-
der to indicate that she meets a certain epis-
temic standard. Which standard ascribers 
ought to employ depends on their interests, 
purposes, concerns, etc.; those may vary from 
one context to the next. An epistemic standard 
determines how good a putative knower’s epis-
temic situation has to be if he is to qualify as a 
knower in the context at hand. 
(ii) A given knowledge ascription might be 
true as uttered in Context C1 but false as ut-
tered in context C2, due to differences in the 
ascribers’ (standard as determined by their) in-
terests, purposes and concerns.  
The considerations adduced above where 
meant to motivate (i). Yet (i) is compatible with 
the claim that although epistemic standards may 
vary this does not affect the truth-value of 
knowledge ascriptions but only their rational as-
sertibility.6 So (ii) does not follow from (i) but 
has to be argued for independently. In order to 
do so, the epistemic contextualist has to defend 
the claim that context (more specifically a con-
textually determined epistemic standard) plays a 
role in fixing the truth-value of knowledge as-
criptions. Knowledge ascriptions are context 
sensitive in that their truth-value varies with var-
iations in the context of ascription. The remain-
der of the paper will be devoted to the question 
of whether and how that can be argued for.  
It is worth noting right from the beginning, 
though, that epistemic contextualism is prem-
ised on the (metaphysical) assumption that 
there is no single, context-invariant epistemic 
standard that has to be met for a knowledge 
ascription to be true. The point is easily missed 
because commonly contextualists don’t seem to 
be concerned with metaphysics. Yet what mo-
tivates a contextualist treatment is exactly the 
insight into a certain interest-and-purpose-
relativity of the discourse in question. It is to a 
certain extent up to the attributors to apply 
whatever epistemic standard it is that best 
serves their purpose; there are different yet 
equally legitimate standards. And if that is so, 
what other standard could be relevant to the 
truth of a given knowledge ascription than the 
one operative in the context of ascription (as-
suming, of course, that the participants in the 
discourse are sufficiently rational and well-
informed)?7 Contextualists are not committed 
to a purely subjetivist position, though. And it 
does not follow that any standard is as good as 
any other either. As pointed out above, a stand-
ard is appropriate only given a particular goal or 
purpose. And the contextualist is eager to point 
out that there are different yet equally legitimate 
goals or purposes. Consequently, there may still 
be better and worse standards–given a particular 
goal or purpose. There is, therefore, room within 
a contextualist framework for a position that 
holds that while the purpose or goals pursued by 
the participants in a context determines which 
standard they ought to employ, the standard 
they in fact employ need not be the standard 
they ought to employ (even given their own 
purpose or goal). Let us now consider the con-
textualist framework in  more detail. To begin 
with, we will look at some examples. 
 
█ Examples 
 
Examples such as Keith DeRose’s bank-case 
Knowledge in Context 
 
61 
or Stewart Cohen’s airport-case are commonly 
adduced to illustrate the contextualist point. 
DeRose, for example, asks us to compare the 
following two cases: 
  
Bank Case A: My wife and I are driving 
home on Friday afternoon. We plan to stop 
at the bank on the way home to deposit our 
paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, 
we notice that the lines inside are very long, 
as they often are on Friday afternoons. Alt-
hough we generally like to deposit our 
paychecks as soon as possible, it is not espe-
cially important that they be deposited right 
away, so I suggest that we drive straight 
home and deposit our paychecks on Satur-
day morning. My wife says, “Maybe the 
bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of 
banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, 
I know it’ll be open. I was just there two 
weeks ago. It’s open until noon.”  
Bank Case B: My wife and I drive past the 
bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, 
and notice the long lines. I again suggest 
that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday 
morning, explaining that I was at the bank 
on Saturday morning only two weeks ago 
and discovered that it was open until noon. 
But in this case, we have just written a very 
large and very important check. If our 
paychecks are not deposited into our check-
ing account before Monday morning, the 
important check we wrote will bounce, leav-
ing us in a very bad situation. And, of 
course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My 
wife reminds me of these facts. She then 
says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you 
know the bank will be open tomorrow?” 
Remaining as confident as I was before that 
the bank will be open then, still, I reply, 
“Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure.”8 
 
And Cohen sketches the following scenario:  
 
Mary and John are at the L.A. airport con-
templating taking a certain flight to New 
York. They want to know whether the flight 
has a layover in Chicago. They overhear 
someone ask if anyone knows whether the 
flight makes any stops. A passenger Smith 
replies, “I do. I just looked at my flight itin-
erary and there is a stop in Chicago”. It 
turns out that Mary and John have a very 
important business contact they have to 
make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, 
“How reliable is that itinerary, anyway. It 
could contain a misprint. They could have 
changed the schedule since it was printed, 
etc”. Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t 
really know that the plane will stop in Chica-
go on the basis of the itinerary. They decide 
to check with the airline agent.9 
 
In both examples a speaker self-ascribes 
knowledge so that the putative knower’s con-
text and the ascriber’s context merge. Consider, 
therefore, the following slightly modified ver-
sion of an example taken from David Annis:  
 
Case A: Susan, Tom and Ann are sitting in a 
coffee shop and talking about medical issues, 
bragging about their lay medical knowledge. 
Tom informs them that Polio is caused by a 
virus. Asked how he knows, he answers that 
he read it in an apothecary leaflet. Given the 
circumstances, Susan says: “Tom knows that 
Polio is caused by a virus.”   
Case B: Now suppose that the context is an 
examination for the M.D. degree. Tom an-
swers as before. The examiner, call him 
John, expects a lot more of Tom and so 
concludes: “Tom does not know that polio 
is caused by a virus.” – irrespective of the 
fact that Tom’s evidential situation, his re-
spective beliefs, reasons, etc., are exactly as 
before.10 
 
The contextualist takes these and similar 
examples to show that contextual factors such 
as the ascribers’ interests, concerns, purposes, 
and background assumptions help setting a 
certain standard of knowledge, the standard 
someone has to live up to in order to reasona-
bly count as a knower (with respect to p) in the 
context at hand. The higher the standard, the 
better the putative knower’s reasons or grounds 
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for believing (that p) have to be. Note that in 
the three cases above both ascriptions are 
about the same person and the same proposi-
tion. Yet the context relevant to fixing the 
knowledge ascription’s truth-value is the as-
criber’s contexts, not the putative knower’s 
context11 (as subject-sensitive invariantism 
would have it). What has changed from the 
first ascription to the second in each case is not 
the situation depicted but the ascriber’s take on 
the situation, due to changes in his/her stand-
ards, interests, concerns, or purposes. Conse-
quently, a given knowledge ascription may be 
true as uttered in one context while the corre-
sponding knowledge denial may be true as ut-
tered in another context. That is explained by 
pointing out epistemic as well as non-epistemic 
differences between the two contexts of ascrip-
tion: differences in what is at stake, in the pur-
pose or point of the conversation, the partici-
pants’ concerns, etc. As a result, contexts of ut-
terance cannot be construed simply as locations 
at which utterances happen to take place. Ra-
ther, contexts have to be seen as providing in-
formation about who is speaking and to whom 
he is speaking but also about the participants’ 
interest (epistemic as well as non-epistemic) 
and concerns, the purposes or point of the con-
versation etc. (for more on the notion of con-
text in play, see below).  
The examples, therefore, seem to show that 
knowledge ascriptions exhibit a form of con-
text-sensitivity. Whether we correctly ascribe 
knowledge to someone or not is sensitive to 
contextual factors as there are cases in which 
speakers with certain interests, purposes and 
intentions can truly assert that person X knows 
that p (given that p is also the case), while other 
speakers with different interests, purposes and 
intentions can truly assert that X doesn’t know 
that p. Moreover, speakers seem to be aware of 
varying contextual requirements governing the 
use of the word “know”. If they weren’t, the 
contextualist stories couldn’t be told in the first 
place. That they can be felicitously told is evi-
dence that speakers (implicitly at least) 
acknowledge different epistemic standards–
relative to different goals or concerns.  
Nonetheless, the context-sensitivity at issue 
is of a subtle kind. Presumably, the word 
“know” is to be held accountable for the con-
text-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions. Yet 
even competent speakers are commonly igno-
rant of the semantic facts postulated.12 While 
they can easily be made to see the context-
sensitivity of indexical expression (genuine in-
dexical expressions being “I”, “here” and 
“now”), for example, they fail to see any alleged 
context-sensitivity of the word “know”.  At 
least they fail to acknowledge any indexical-like 
context-sensitivity in the case of “know“ as is 
evidenced by the fact that they tend to homo-
phonically report on knowledge ascriptions. 
Compare the following two cases:  
 
Case A: Susan: “Tom knows that the opera 
starts at eight”. Fred who did not listen asks: 
“What did Susan say?” Mary reports: “Su-
san said that Tom knows that the opera 
starts at eight.” 
Case B: Susan: “I am hungry.” Fred: “What 
did Susan say?” *Mary reports: “Susan said 
that I am hungry.”  
 
As the infelicity of the last line of the second 
dialogue indicates, in reporting on indexical ut-
terances one has to accommodate the context-
sensitivity of the indexical expression (“I”, in 
the case of Mary report on Susan’s utterance) 
and adjust one’s report accordingly. Yet noth-
ing like that seems to be required in reporting 
on a knowledge ascription. A speaker who re-
ports on a knowledge ascription will commonly 
not have the impression that something con-
text-sensitive (about a contextually given epis-
temic standard or a particular knowledge rela-
tion) has been said. 
Moreover, if knowledge ascriptions were 
context-sensitive, speaker A who by employing 
demanding standards would deny that S knows 
that P and speaker B who by employing relaxed 
standards would claim that S knows that P 
would not really be in disagreement with each 
other; at least they could both be right.13  
What is needed is an account that allows us 
to accommodate somewhat conflicting data:  
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(i) on the one hand we observe that our prac-
tice of ascribing knowledge and our use of the 
word “know” seems to be governed by contex-
tually varying epistemic standards, (ii) on the 
other hand we observe that even competent 
speakers don’t seem to be aware of any indexi-
cal-like context-sensitivity of the word “know”. 
Consequently, much turns on how the alleged 
context-sensitivity of knowledge-ascriptions 
can be further spelled out. It has to be of a sub-
tle, unobvious kind.  
But now it might seem fairly ad hoc to pos-
tulate any such subtle, non-indexical, context-
sensitivity of the word “know”. A closer look at 
the ways in which natural language expression 
can be sensitive to context and at other cases of 
context-sensitivity will show that most (if not 
all) natural language expression exhibit one ver-
sion of context-sensitivity or another. So by way 
of reply to the objection that postulating con-
text-sensitivity in the case of knowledge ascrip-
tions is entirely ad hoc I will point out that natu-
ral language expressions are context-sensitive in 
all kinds of ways, and subtly so. I will come back 
to the case of knowledge ascriptions. 
 
█ Context-sensitivity 
 
Unfortunately, different things go by the 
name “context-sensitivity”. A fairly uncontro-
versial example is provided by indexical expres-
sions like “I”, “here” or “now”, and demonstra-
tives like “this” or “that”. Pia’s use of the word 
“I” has Pia and only her in its extension, while 
Jon’s use of the very same word has Jon and on-
ly him in its extension.14 As a consequence, the 
sentence “I am hungry” may be true as uttered 
by Pia (at t) but false as uttered by Jon (at t). 
Similarly, Pia’s utterance of “This is an ’82 Cha-
teau Margaux.” may be true while Jon’s utter-
ance of the very same sentence may well be 
false. That much is uncontroversial. Yet Con-
textualists are notorious for claiming there to 
be much more context-sensitivity than has tra-
ditionally been acknowledged.  
To begin with, note that context has to be 
appealed to at every stage in linguistic interpre-
tation. Even in order to phonetically recognize 
what has been said in a given utterance appeal 
has to be made to context because   
 
in normal speech it is physically impossible 
to hear each segment: speech is just to fast. 
Twenty segments a second is not unlikely, 
but the brain cannot distinguish even half 
that number of separate sounds at a time.15  
 
Word recognition is to large extent guess-
work. Speakers when trying to phonetically fig-
ure out what has been said will avail themselves 
of whatever contextual clue they can lay their 
hands on. But that is just the beginning. There 
is also: 
 
▶ Indexicality 
▶ Demonstrative reference 
▶ Anaphoric reference 
▶ Definite and indefintive descriptions 
▶ Non-sentential expressions and ellipsis 
▶ Subtle forms of incompleteness 
▶ Metonymy 
▶ Homonymy 
▶ Metaphor 
▶ Polysemy 
 
The list is hardly exhaustive. Yet I will leave it 
at that and briefly comment only on the less 
known phenomena on the list. So besides much-
discussed cases of overt context-sensitivity such 
as indexicality, demonstrative and anaphoric ref-
erence, and definite as well as indefinite descrip-
tions, there are different forms of (syntactic, se-
mantic, maybe even pragmatic) incomplete-
ness.16 Often, we use non-sentential and elliptic 
assertions.17 But we also encounter subtler forms 
of incompleteness:  
 
(a) Steel isn’t strong enough18  
(b) Mending this fault will take time19 
(c) Jill cant’t continue.20 
(d) John is tall21  
(e) He bought John’s book22  
 
All these sentences can be used to say (or 
communicate) different things relative to dif-
ferent contexts of utterance. They ask for dif-
 Kompa 
 
64 
ferent contextual completions. Sentence c, for 
example, can be used to say that Jill can’t con-
tinue school, or that she can’t continue dance 
classes, or university education, and so on. And 
John can be said to be tall for a fifth grader, or 
for an NBA player, etc. Also, someone who as-
serts sentence f may talk about the book John 
wrote, or the one he just bought, or the one he 
edited, or the one he is working on, or the one 
that came to be called “John’s book” for what-
ever other reason. (That is not to deny, though, 
that some of the sentences have preferred or 
default completions.) 
Another very common form of context-
sensitivity is metonymy. We often use a term to 
refer not to its literal referent but to something 
that is saliently related to the literal referent.23 
Next, there is abundant ambiguity in natural 
languages. It comes in two varieties: as lexical 
and as syntactic ambiguity, the most widely dis-
cussed instances of the later being scope ambi-
guities as in “Everyone loves someone”. 
Within lexical ambiguity one may further 
distinguish between homonymy and polysemy. 
Homonymous expressions lack an encompass-
ing reading; they 
 
strongly resist any kind of unification. Take 
the case of bank. It is hard to think of the 
different sorts of bank as parts of a whole, 
or as united into a global Gestalt. We might 
think of a very general category to which 
they both belong, such as “entity”, or even 
“location”, but this is not good enough, be-
cause it does not distinguish banks from 
non-banks.24  
 
Homonymous expressions enjoy only finite-
ly many, discrete, and natural readings; as op-
posed to stipulated precisifications. The word 
“fast” can mean “faster than 20 mph”, but that 
is not a natural reading of “fast”.25  
Polysemy, on the other hand, issues often, 
though not always, from lexicalizing a meta-
phorical use of a word. On encountering a new 
abstract or mental phenomenon, we commonly 
tend to conceptualize it by using familiar vo-
cabulary on pain of having to unduly stretched 
the “old meaning” in order that the word be-
comes applicable to the new situation (think of 
the political landscape or the virus contaminat-
ing your computer).26 In so doing, we  often 
borrow expressions from the concrete realm of 
sense experience: We are feeling blue, or com-
plain about her being cold, hard or thin-skinned. 
Consequently, metaphor is a driving force be-
hind language change, resulting, occasionally, 
in polysemy. Compare the following: 
 
(a) The janitor goes from the top to the bot-
tom of the building. 
(b) The staircase goes from the top to the 
bottom of the building. 
(c) The river Ganges goes from the Hima-
layas to the Indian Ocean. 
(d) The power of prayer goes round the 
world.27 
 
But one might also invoke a broader notion 
of polysemy according to which polysemy  
 
is understood [...] in a broad sense as varia-
tion in the construal of a word on different 
occasions of use.28 
 
If understood that way, polysemy becomes 
even more pervasive and seems to affect (al-
most) all natural language expressions. The 
verb “walk” for example, can be used to de-
scribe a toddler’s first steps, a dancer’s elegant 
pace or an old man’s cautious moves. What 
counts as walking depends on context; many dif-
ferent things might thus count.29 There are as 
many different uses to which we may put the 
words of our language, as there are purposes we 
might pursue and interests we might have. Con-
sequently, context-sensitivity is ubiquitous. We 
interpret peoples’ utterances against the back-
ground of a shared system of knowledge, and in 
light of common purposes and concerns.30  
Whether something can truly be said to be 
circular, hexagonal or flat, for example, de-
pends on how much laxity is permissible. Given 
such and such contextual requirements, only 
something close to being perfectly circular can 
be truly described as such. Given other re-
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quirements, anything of roughly circular form 
will do. Also, whether something can be said to 
be interesting, helpful, good, new, exciting, le-
gitimate, reliable, worthwhile, evident, etc. de-
pends on the participants' standards, purposes, 
background assumptions, and so on and so 
forth. And the point generalizes even further as 
whether something can be said to be green, or 
round, or a game of baseball (or what have you) 
depends on the participants’ interests, inten-
tions, etc. as well. Here is an example taken 
from Anne Bezuidenhout:  
 
My son comes into the kitchen from the 
backyard and when I ask him what he has 
been doing he replies: “I've been playing 
baseball”. Is what he says true? Well, the 
game he was playing resembles standard 
league baseball games only rather remotely. 
There certainly is no baseball diamond in 
our backyard. In the game my son plays 
with his father and our dog in our backyard, 
the bases are marked by three trees that 
stand in a very rough diamond shape with 
respect to “home base”, which is itself a ra-
ther poorly defined place somewhere at the 
fourth point of the rough diamond. The 
game is played only with a pitcher and a bat-
ter. When the batter makes it to the base, he 
leaves an “invisible man” on base and returns 
to bat. The dog plays in the outfield. Some-
times he returns the ball to the batter and 
sometimes he chases the runner round the 
base with the ball in his mouth, but not in 
any predictable way. Yet this joint activity 
counts as playing baseball, as playing baseball 
is understood in this context. So if my son 
was in fact playing baseball on this under-
standing, then what my son says is true.31   
 
We call someone an F or something G in 
the light of certain interests and goals, to a par-
ticular purpose, and against the background of 
certain assumptions. And when we interpret 
these utterances and assess them as true or 
false, then we interpret and assess them in the 
light of these interests, purposes, and assump-
tions. Yet all these factors vary with context. 
Different forms of context-sensitivity may be 
traced back to different sources, though. And 
one need not treat all subtle forms of context-
sensitivity as cases of polysemy in the broad 
sense. To see that, let us come back to the case of 
indexical expressions (“I”, “here”, “now”) for a 
moment. What does the context-sensitivity of 
indexical expressions consist in? According to a 
venerable characterization due to Arthur Burks:  
 
[…] the meaning of a token of a non-
indexical symbol is always the same as the 
meaning of the type to which it belongs. 
The case is different with an indexical sym-
bol, however, for the spatiotemporal location 
of a given token of such a symbol is relevant 
to the meaning of that token: “now” means 
two different things when it is uttered on two 
different days. Since the meaning of the type 
to which any symbol belongs (whether in-
dexical or non-indexical) is always the same, 
it follows that the meaning of a token of an 
indexical symbol is different from the mean-
ing of the type to which it belongs.32  
 
In more contemporary jargon, the point may 
be put thus: A sentence (type) is context-
sensitive if and only if different token of it can 
have different truth-values, owing to difference 
in the respective contexts of utterance. More 
generally, an expression type is context-sensitive 
if and only if different token of it can have dif-
ferent extensions (a declarative sentence’s exten-
sion being its truth-value).  
 
█ Indexical vs. nonindexical contextualism 
 
Still, there are two places at which context-
sensitivity might enter the picture. According 
to a view famously held by David Kaplan,33 the 
overall import of a linguistic expression breaks 
down into two components: the expression’s 
character and its content. Both can be con-
strued as functions, the character of an expres-
sion being a function from the context of utter-
ance into the expression’s content, the content 
being a function from possible circumstances of 
evaluation into the extension of the expression 
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(the truth value, in the case of sentences) in the 
respective circumstances. The character deter-
mines content as a function of context. The con-
tent in turn determines truth-value as a function 
of circumstances of evaluation. What is a con-
text, and what are circumstances of evaluation? 
 
From this point of view, context is a package 
of whatever parameters are needed to deter-
mine referent, and thus content, of the directly 
referential expressions of the language.34 
 
A circumstance will usually include a possi-
ble state or history of the world, a time, and 
perhaps other features as well. The amount 
of information we require from a circum-
stance is linked to the degree of specificity 
of contents, and thus to the kinds of opera-
tors in the language.35 
 
David Lewis distinguishes in a similar vein 
between a context and an index, thereby empha-
sizing the two roles context has to play.36 It has 
to supply the denotations to indexical and other 
obviously content-sensitive terms in a sentence, 
thereby helping to determine the utterance’s 
content (what has been said, or the proposition 
expressed– I am using these two phrases synon-
ymously here). Yet it also has to provide a list of 
features (an index, in Lewis’ terminology) on 
which the truth of the whole utterance may de-
pend, thereby helping to determine the utter-
ance’s truth-value. Much ink has been spilled on 
the question of which features may be relevant 
to truth (and it is a hotly contested issue in con-
temporary philosophy of language). Lewis him-
self was well aware of the problem:  
 
I emphasized that the dependences of truth 
on context was surprisingly multifarious. It 
would be no easy matter to devise a list of all 
the features of context that are sometimes 
relevant to truth in English. In [General 
Semantics, N.K.] I gave a list that was long 
for its days, but not nearly long enough.37 
 
So context may affect truth-value in various 
ways. Now recall the characterization of con-
text-sensitivity given above, according to which 
a sentence is context-sensitive if and only if dif-
ferent tokens of it may differ in truth-value, 
owing to differences in the respective contexts 
of utterance. Given the Kaplanian/Lewisian 
framework, context can affect truth-value (ex-
tension) either directly by affecting which con-
tent has been expressed or indirectly by provid-
ing circumstances of evaluation with features 
on which the utterance’s truth-value may de-
pend. In the indexical case, context directly af-
fects content. If Pia were to say: “I am hungry”, 
she would, presumable, have expressed some-
thing like the following content: that Pia is 
hungry (at t). In other cases of context-
sensitivity, it is less clear whether context di-
rectly affects content. A much-discussed case is 
the case of taste predicates. Consider the fol-
lowing dialogue (if that is what it is):  
 
Jon: “Licorice is tasty.”  
Pia: “Licorice is not tasty at all.”  
 
Pia and Jon may both say something true, it 
seems. But at least on the linguistic surface, Pia 
contradicts what Jon says. Enter: Context-
sensitivity. They can both say something true 
because the sentence used is context-sensitive. 
But does context affect content? Does Jon, for 
example, express the proposition that Licorice is 
tasty to him, or that it is pleasing to his taste or 
any such proposition in which explicit refer-
ence is made to the speaker?  
Or does he rather express the proposition 
that Licorice is tasty, yet that proposition in 
turn has to be evaluated relative to circum-
stances of evaluation comprising – among oth-
er features – also his taste? Both options are 
available to the contextualist. Context-
sensitivity could enter the picture at two differ-
ent levels; either via context directly or via cir-
cumstances of evaluation/index. Which option 
the contextualist chooses determines whether 
she is (what came to be called) an Indexical or a 
Nonindexical Contextualist.38 One may be an 
Indexical Contextualist concerning one type of 
expressions (predicates of personal taste, for 
example) and a Nonindexical Contextualist 
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concerning another type of expressions (predi-
cates of moral evaluation, for example).  
But let us finally come back to the case of 
knowledge ascriptions. The Indexical and the 
Nonindexical Contextualist with respect to 
knowledge ascriptions will agree that all factors 
needed to fix the truth-value of a knowledge 
ascription are supplied by the context of utter-
ance. They differ in their underlying concep-
tion of content or proposition expressed, 
though. According to the Indexicalist context 
supplies a certain epistemic standard that 
somehow becomes part of the proposition ex-
pressed in a knowledge ascription. He favors an 
‘opulent’ conception of content. A speaker, call 
him John, who says something like “Tom 
knows that the opera starts at eight” will there-
by express the content that Tom knows that 
the opera starts at eight relative to a certain ep-
istemic standard or that Tom knowsJohn that the 
opera starts at eight, where knowJohn is a particu-
lar concept of knowledge denoted by John’s use 
of the word “know”. Another speaker, by utter-
ing exactly the same sentence (and talking 
about the same person, Tom and the same 
time, t) will express a different content. He will 
express something to the effect that Tom knows 
relative to his (the speaker’s) epistemic standard 
or falls under his favored concept of knowledge. 
The Indexical Contextualist emphasizes that 
there is much more and also subtler context-
sensitivity at the level of content than one might 
have thought. People express different contents 
by means of the same sentence.  
The Nonindexicalist has a different take on 
the matter. According to the Nonindexicalist, 
context does not affect the proposition ex-
pressed (or only to the extent that the 
knowledge ascription contains obviously index-
ical expressions). She favors a “slender” concep-
tion of content. The proposition expressed by a 
knowledge ascription, for example, does not 
contain an epistemic standard or any such 
thing. For when a speaker makes a knowledge 
claim of the form “X knows that p”, he will not 
have the impression of having said something 
about epistemic standards. And that is because 
he did not say anything about epistemic stand-
ards. Yet the proposition is true or false only 
relative to circumstances of evaluation that 
comprises not just the world and time of con-
text (as on the traditional Kaplanian model) 
but also an epistemic standard, and maybe a 
standard of taste and a moral standard as well. 
There are more parameters relative to which a 
given proposition has to be evaluated as true or 
false than one might have thought. Conse-
quently, Nonindexical Contextualists empha-
size that there is more context-sensitivity at the 
level of evaluation than one might have though.  
Both accounts face serious objections; their 
various merits and drawbacks are subject of 
heated debates.39 As mentioned before, Indexi-
cal Contextualism makes speakers “semantical-
ly blind”.40 Even competent speaker are com-
monly not aware of having used a context-
sensitive term (the word “know”) in making a 
knowledge ascription. Also, according to In-
dexical Contextualists disagreement between 
two speakers as to whether a third person 
knows something comes out as merely verbal 
disagreement, for the one does not deny what 
the other one asserts as they express different 
contents by means of the word “know”. 
Whether Nonindexical Contextualism is better 
suited to account for disagreement is a very 
controversial issue, though.41 Moreover, the 
Nonindexical Contextualist is committed to a 
relativized notion of propositional truth: prop-
ositions are not true or false simpliciter but only 
as evaluated relative to circumstances of evalu-
ation. That is not to everyone’s liking as it calls 
for a drastic departure from semantic and 
truth-theoretic orthodoxy.42  
Ought one to be an Indexical or rather a 
Nonindexical Contextualists concerning the case 
of knowledge ascriptions then? That depends. 
Both accounts seem to be able to accommodate 
certain cases. So instead of trying to adjudicate 
between the two positions let’s consider which 
account successfully handles what cases. Those 
cases in which the fact that one speaker says 
something true by making a particular 
knowledge ascriptions while another speaker 
also says something true by making the corre-
sponding knowledge denial is best explained on 
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the assumption that both speakers employ dif-
ferent concepts of knowledge (and so express 
different things by means of the word “know”) 
are aptly modeled by an indexicalist semantics.  
In most cases discussed in the contextualist 
literature such as the examples given at the be-
ginning, however, this is usually not the issue. 
(To the extent to which the examples given at 
the beginning are representative, this gives one 
a reason to favor Nonindexical Contextualism 
over Indexical Contextualism.) Speakers might 
agree on the meaning of the word “know” and 
still make different ascriptions. In these cases, 
therefore, ascribers seem to employ different 
standards; standards, that is, for how much it 
takes to qualify as a knower in the context in 
question. Consequently, these cases are best 
modeled along Nonindexicalist lines. So 
whether one favors Indexical or Nonindexical 
Epistemic Contextualism depends on whether 
one construes cases in which speakers make 
different knowledge ascriptions (to a particular 
person) as being grounded in differences in 
their meaning of the word “know” or in differ-
ences in the epistemic standard employed. Both 
cases may occur. Therefore instead of seeing 
both semantic models as competing with one 
another one might more aptly see them as 
complementing each other. 
  
█ Summary 
 
I take the account sketched here to be a plea 
for epistemic pluralism and epistemic modesty 
much in the spirit of Sandkühler’s Kritik der 
Repräsentation.43 Epistemic Contextualism is a 
theory about how epistemic practice is affected by 
our interests and concerns; and about how those 
concerns may be subject to contextual variation. 
It is pluralist in that it denies that there is a single, 
absolute epistemic standard someone has to meet 
in order to qualify as a knower. Rather, we ascribe 
or deny knowledge to someone in light of our in-
terests, concerns, assumptions, and to a particular 
purpose. Knowledge is something we possess or 
fail to possess only relative to an ascriber’s con-
text. Knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive.  
And the point generalizes as context-
sensitivity is a ubiquitous phenomenon of nat-
ural language. It affects knowledge ascriptions 
but many other expressions, too. Firstly, there 
is much more context-sensitivity at the level of 
content than has traditionally been acknowl-
edged. Often, we use expressions in subtly dif-
ferent ways; we may express different things 
when we use words such as “knowledge” or “jus-
tice” or “truth”. In these cases, we express differ-
ent propositions by means of these words. Not 
all context-sensitivity has to take the form of in-
dexicality; though. Most context-sensitivity is of 
a more subtle kind.44  
But secondly, there is also much more con-
text-sensitivity at the level of evaluation than 
has traditionally been acknowledged. We have 
to figure out what a speaker has  said in an ut-
terance; but we also have to evaluate it as true 
or false. There is a difference between what it 
takes, say, to be rich and how much it takes to 
be rich. Much of what we say isn’t true or false 
as it stands but stands to be evaluated as true or 
false in light of our interests, concerns, and to a 
particular purpose. The table, for example, may 
reasonably count as being flat in light of certain 
interests and goals but not in light of others. 
And Mary may be rich enough for some pur-
poses but not for others. The sentences “The 
table is flat” or “Mary is rich” may be true as 
uttered in some contexts but not in others.45 
And speakers may differ over the question 
which epistemic, moral, aesthetic standard or 
which standard of wealth etc. to apply. John 
might be in a good enough epistemic position 
for present purposes, but not for others.  
Contextualists are united in emphasizing 
the vast context-sensitivity of natural language. 
It is, they insist, an expedient we could not do 
without. It allows us to use a finite vocabulary 
to converse about an in principle infinite array 
of situations. That is a case of what Jon Barwise 
and John Perry call the efficiency of language.46 
Our expressions can be made to fit all the vari-
ous situations we encounter and all the differ-
ent interests and concerns we might have al-
most perfectly. They can be adjusted, modulat-
ed, if need be; and need there is. Fortunately, 
language answers to our needs.47  
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